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Much of the structure in social networks has been explained by two seemingly independent net-
work evolution mechanisms: triadic closure and homophily. While it is common to consider these
mechanisms separately or in the frame of a static model, empirical studies suggest that their dy-
namic interplay is the very process responsible for the homophilous patterns of association seen in
off- and online social networks. By combining these two mechanisms in a minimal solvable dynamic
model, we confirm theoretically the long-held and empirically established hypothesis that homophily
can be amplified by the triadic closure mechanism. This research approach allows us to estimate
how much of the observed homophily in various friendship and communication networks is due to
amplification for a given amount of triadic closure. We find that the cumulative advantage-like
process leading to homophily amplification can, under certain circumstances, also lead to the widely
documented core-periphery structure of social networks, as well as to the emergence of memory of
previous homophilic constraints (equivalent to hysteresis phenomena in physics). The theoretical
understanding provided by our results highlights the importance of early intervention in manag-
ing at the societal level the most adverse effects of homophilic decision-making, such as inequality,
segregation and online echo chambers.
One of the most important traits of human sociality
is homophily [1], the tendency of similar people to be
connected to each other due to their shared biological
and cultural attributes such as gender, occupation, or
political affiliation. It has been observed across various
social networks [2–8] and it is a major force behind sev-
eral pressing social issues including inequality, segrega-
tion, and online echo chambers [9–11]. Thus a thorough
quantitative understanding of the network mechanisms
leading to homophily [12–15] is essential for promoting a
sufficient flow of information [16] and equal opportunity
in social networks of individuals with diverse personal
preferences.
The homophily observed in social networks is often
attributed either to choice homophily, defined by peo-
ple’s preference when choosing whom to connect with,
or to induced homophily, rising from the constraints in
the opportunities of individuals to make connections [17].
However, as suggested by longitudinal empirical results
[18, 19], these two mechanisms of homophily generation
cannot be separated without considering the cumulative
advantage-like dynamics [13] driving the evolution of so-
cial networks: Choice homophily creates circumstances
for induced homophily, such as groups of similar people,
which are then further reinforced in cycles of choice and
induced homophily. While the dynamics of homophily
is well understood in the case of tipping point models of
residential segregation [20, 21], a similar understanding
of the dynamics in social networks is still needed in order
to validate and measure homophily amplification.
Here we introduce a minimal model of social network
evolution to analyse to what extent the structural con-
straints caused by triadic closure affect observed ho-
mophily. The triadic closure mechanism has been re-
ported as the most common structural constraint [18]
and can explain many salient features of empirical social
networks. These include a high number of closed trian-
gles between acquaintances and fat-tailed degree distri-
butions [22–25]. Thus triadic closure should be consid-
ered as the main mechanism in most minimal dynamic so-
cial network models [22, 26, 27]. In our approach, individ-
uals are considered to belong to either of the two groups
representing the values of a static attribute of interest
(gender, class, party, etc.) and they are let to rewire their
connections by two mechanisms: triadic closure (mod-
elling the creation of edges via current contacts) and
random rewiring [emulating any unknown mechanisms
beyond triadic closure, such as focal closure in large foci
[18, 28]]. Choice homophily/heterophily is implemented
by accepting new links with a bias probability depen-
dent on the similarity of attributes between individuals
(see Fig. 1 and Materials and Methods [MM] for a more
detailed model definition and parameters).
In this study we characterise the rich tapestry of emer-
gent behaviour captured by the model with a mean-field
bifurcation analysis for varying relative group sizes, tri-
adic closure probabilities, and choice homophily rates.
By tuning the parameters of the system with empiri-
cal data on friendship and communication networks, we
find that, under the right circumstances, even a small
amount of choice homophily may be greatly amplified
by triadic closure. This suggests that the observations
of homophilous patterns of association in society should
not be interpreted solely on the basis of a human prefer-
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FIG. 1. Mechanisms of triadic closure and choice
homophily. (A) A focal node selected uniformly at ran-
dom (green boundary) finds a candidate neighbour by either
(B) selecting a node uniformly at random with probability
1 − c, or by (D) closing a triangle with probability c. (C,
E) For a focal node in group i, the candidate neighbour in
group j is accepted with probability Sij (where i, j ∈ {a, b}).
We parametrise Sij with tunable parameters sa, sb such that
Saa = sa, Sbb = sb, Sab = 1 − sa, and Sba = 1 − sb. If the
potential edge (dashed line) is accepted, an edge of the focal
node (selected uniformly at random) is replaced by one be-
tween the focal and candidate neighbour nodes. Otherwise no
edges are rewired. (F) Probability (T 2)aa of choosing a can-
didate neighbour with triadic closure from the same group
as the focal node as a function of observed homophily Taa
for equally sized (na = nb) and equally connected groups
(Taa = Tbb and Tab = Tba = 1 − Taa). If the network is not
randomly mixed (Taa 6= 1/2), the probability of triadic clo-
sure choosing two nodes of the same group is always larger
than the same probability if the selection is done uniformly at
random (1/2), implying that triadic closure amplifies existing
homophily in the network. However, triadic closure without
choice homophily is not enough to maintain the observed ho-
mophily in the network, which would make (T 2)aa equal to
the observed homophily (dotted and solid lines cross). An
exception is the case Taa = 1, where two completely sepa-
rate components exist and triadic closure cannot create edges
between them.
ence for similarity, but as a constantly evolving interplay
between structural constraints and homophily, one that
requires computational simulation as a central part of the
analysis.
RESULTS
In our approach, the interplay between homophily and
triadic closure in a social network with two attribute
groups forms a dynamical system, in which the evolu-
tion from an arbitrary initial network depends on the
parameters that regulate choice homophily and triadic
closure. As with any other network model, the asso-
ciated stochastic process exhibits random fluctuations,
but the average dynamics of key behavioural quantities
such as the degree distribution, clustering coefficient, and
centrally, the observed homophily, depend deterministi-
cally on the parameters. We characterise the behaviour
of the system by using a mean-field bifurcation analysis
and confirm our results with numerical simulations (see
MM and Supplementary Information [SI]).
When individuals form new edges in a network with ex-
isting homophilous patterns of connectivity, they link to
their own group even without being explicitly homophilic
(Fig. 1F), a tendency that is even more prominent in the
presence of a choice homophily bias. This process in-
creases the observed homophily in the network beyond
that due to choice homophily, which in turn increases the
likelihood for homophilic connections in upcoming triadic
closure events. The result of this cumulative advantage-
like cycle is an amplification of choice homophily, as long
as groups are comparable in size and edges are not exclu-
sively created by triadic closure (Fig. 2B). In the extreme
case of no random rewiring (lack of other mechanisms of
edge creation), even a moderate choice homophily bias
will segregate the social network into fully disconnected
groups (see SI for a derivation of this result).
In addition to homophily amplification, the triadic clo-
sure mechanism and choice homophily may also lead to
a core-periphery [29–31] social structure where the core
group connects almost exclusively with itself, while the
periphery group connects with the core group even in
the presence of choice homophily (Fig. 2B inset). This
effect, seemingly opposed to the drive of individuals to
find homophilous connections in the periphery group, is
due to the large likelihood of finding a candidate neigh-
bour in the core group while attempting to close triangles
(Fig. 1D). A core-periphery social structure is possible
when choice homophily biases are moderate and triadic
closure is high, or when there is asymmetry in the social
network due to unequal group sizes or choice homophily
biases (Fig. 2E)
The rise of homophily amplification and core-periphery
social structures depends not only on the parameters
regulating triadic closure and choice homophily, but on
the initial conditions and random fluctuations of network
evolution, meaning that the system exhibits memory of
previous structural constraints, or homophily hysteresis
(see Fig. 2B for an example, and Fig. 2E for a more sys-
tematic analysis). In other words, the social network can
experience dramatic non-reversible changes if the system
parameters change, suggesting that real social networks
may have persistent memory of homophily, with a struc-
ture dependent both on current choice homophily biases
and their history. Therefore, the timing of interventions
aiming to reduce observed homophily or the formation
of core groups in, say, an online social network, can be
critical. Once the network has reached a stable point
of its dynamics or is close to one, it can be much more
difficult to drive the system to another stable point by
attempting to change the choice homophily of individuals
or other parameters.
3FIG. 2. Interplay between triadic closure and homophily. (A) Stable fixed points of the model based on bifurcation
analysis (see SI) and classified by large/low intra- and inter-group connectivity (continuous/dashed lines) relative to other fixed
points (nb > na). Fixed point 0 has many edges within groups and few between, while in fixed point + (−) the large (small)
group forms the core and attracts edges from the small (large) periphery group. These fixed points can often be characterised
as homophily amplification or core-periphery structure. Stable points have saddle fixed points as unstable variants (U0, U+,
and U−) with qualitatively similar relative connectivities. (B) Fraction of neighbours Taa in the same group of a focal node
in group a, as a function of choice homophily s = sa = sb for na = nb and varying triadic closure c. Mean-field calculations
(lines) and numerical simulations (crosses) agree perfectly (see SI for more systematic analysis). For these values of c the only
stable point is 0, such that increasing triadic closure leads to higher homophily amplification. Inset: Case c = 0.9 where both
stable/unstable points (continuous/dashed lines) exist. Since na = nb fixed points +/− are equivalent, but for suitable choice
homophily 0.56 < s < 0.70 one group becomes the core and the other periphery. (C-D) Euclidean distance δ in (Taa, Tbb)-space
between current state of the dynamics and fixed points + (C) and U0 (D) as a function of time t (in units of the average number
of times an edge is selected for rewiring) for na = nb, c = 0.9, s = 0.6 (dashed vertical line in panel B inset), and several initial
network configurations. The dynamics amplifies homophily first by quickly approaching the unstable point U0, and then by
slowly approaching a core-periphery stable point (+/−). For one of the initial conditions chosen, the dynamics approaches −
rather than +. (E) Phase diagrams of available fixed points in (s, c)-space (upper row, s = sa = sb) and (sb, sa)-space (lower
row, c = 0.95), both for na = nb (left column) and na = 0.1 (right column). Dashed line corresponds to parameter values in
panel B inset, and the dot to panels C and D. Panel B corresponds to the region with a single fixed point (0) in the upper left
diagram.
The time scales at which the social network is driven
towards homophily amplification or a core-periphery
structure vary greatly (Fig. 2C). Homophily amplifica-
tion is generally a fast process, requiring only a few
rewiring events per edge for the social network to reach a
stable point. On the other hand, a core-periphery so-
cial structure evolves slowly towards equilibrium, and
even if a network would eventually stabilise to a core-
periphery structure it may exhibit fast homophily ampli-
fication first (Fig. 2D). This result suggests that real so-
cial networks, both in society and online platforms, might
not show a stable, fully realised core-periphery structure,
but a transient state slowly drifting towards the struc-
tural dominance of one group over the other. In the case
that the network is first driven towards homophily am-
plification, the group that eventually becomes the core
can depend purely on random chance (Fig. 2C).
In order to estimate how much the observed homophily
differs from choice homophily in real-world social net-
works, as well as to find the stable point that best corre-
sponds to their structure, we fit several empirical datasets
of off- and online social interactions to our model of tri-
adic closure and choice homophily (Fig. 3). In all studied
cases, we observe that both groups are homophilic and
we estimate that they are also intrinsically homophilic
(in terms of choice homophily). Three of them show ho-
mophily amplification in both groups: a Facebook friend-
ship network consisting of two classes in a US univer-
sity [32], a one-day contact network of primary school
students divided by gender [33], and a network of po-
4litical blogs divided by party affiliation [34]. The rest
of them – a friendship network in a website for sharing
music listening habits (Last.fm) and a mobile phone call
network, both divided by gender [35] – display a pattern
where part of the observed homophily within the smaller
female group could be explained by homophily amplifica-
tion, but the choice homophily in the larger male popu-
lation could be underestimated due to the triadic closure
mechanism.
The maximum relative difference we measure between
the estimated choice homophily and the observed ho-
mophily, A(1), goes up to around 60% for the social net-
work of political blogs and the largest Facebook network,
with each exact estimate of choice homophily depending
on the latent tendency for triadic closure in the system
(c). However, the parity of the amplification [A(c)] is
independent of this estimate, and the growth of ampli-
fication is monotonous as a function of c. A systematic
analysis of 100 Facebook networks [32] reveals that the
maximum estimated values for amplification [A(1)] are
all positive and that the largest network is a typical ex-
ample among these networks (Fig. 3). Our results sug-
gest that using observed homophily as a naive estimator
for choice homophily can lead to a significant overesti-
mation or underestimation of the intensity of homophily
(even for a moderate amount of triadic closure) in sev-
eral real-world social networks, both in society and online
platforms.
DISCUSSION
Our findings show that the homophilous patterns of as-
sociation typically seen in empirical social networks arise
not only due to an individual preference for similarity,
but are the result of a cumulative advantage-like pro-
cess that has the tendency to amplify this intrinsic bias
for choice homophily due to triadic closure. By means
of a minimal model of social network evolution, we find
bounds of the amounts of triadic closure and choice ho-
mophily necessary for such amplification of homophily to
arise. This corroborates theoretically previous observa-
tions in organisational [36] and communication [18, 19]
networks. In the generic case of a moderate amount of tri-
adic closure events and similarly sized attribute groups,
choice homophily is amplified by triadic closure through
a tipping point mechanism analogous to the one responsi-
ble for residential segregation in the Schelling model [20],
in which segregation takes place in the social network
topology rather than in the physical space.
In addition to the homophily amplification, our re-
sults suggest that the interplay between triadic closure
and choice homophily is a plausible explanation for the
emergence of the core-periphery structure found in so-
cial, communication, academic, trade, and financial net-
works [29–31]. In such structures, the core group of indi-
viduals is so well connected that following the edges via
triadic closure almost always leads to the same group,
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FIG. 3. Homophily amplification in real-world so-
cial networks. Estimated relative homophily amplification
A(c) = [sˆ(0) − sˆ(c)]/|sˆ(0)| of each attribute group in several
empirical datasets, where sˆ(c) = 2s(c) − 1 is the estimate
of choice homophily s for given triadic closure c, normalized
such that sˆ = 0 implies no homophily/heterophily in the net-
work. Edges, nodes and attributes in each dataset are: Face-
book friendships for users by graduation year in the largest
of the 100 networks (Facebook), links between political blogs
by party (Ploblogs), friendships between students by gender
(School), Last.fm friendships for users by gender (Last.fm),
and calls between individuals by gender (Mobile). The small
group a is denoted by a red line. Scatter plot: Correlation
between maximum homophily amplification Ai(1) for groups
i = a, b in 100 universities of the Facebook dataset (na < nb).
The largest network is marked with a red cross. See MM and
Table I for dataset details.
making the core even more connected. While triadic clo-
sure and homophily are already considered as the con-
tributing factors in the formation of communities (co-
hesive and assortative groups densely connected within),
the impact of node attributes on the core-periphery struc-
ture is less studied. Our model implies that the dynamic
transition to core-periphery networks is slow and often
preceded by the fast but temporary homophily amplifi-
cation. This may partly explain why the social networks
literature has focused on clustered networks rather than
other, rarer types of intermediate-scale structures.
The coupled effects of triadic closure and choice ho-
mophily we observe, include also the memory of ho-
mophilic constraints, i.e. systems with multiple and
co-existing stable points for a wide range of relative
group sizes and amounts of triadic closure and choice
homophily. In other words, social networks may preserve
memory of their previous structural configurations, mak-
ing it difficult to alter the shape of a stable network, for
example, by varying the typical choice homophily of its
individuals. Our findings suggest that, when planning ex-
ternal intervention in order to reduce homophily-induced
social segregation, the action measures should be taken
sooner rather than later, since the scale of interventions
with meaningful effect on the structure of the social net-
5work increases with time.
As the choice homophily is not directly observable from
a static social network data, one needs to infer it from
the available information. Such inference is always sub-
ject to assuming a model for the data creation, and the
exact estimates for the choice homophily should always
be interpreted with this in mind. For example, our styl-
ized model and estimation procedure assumes that the
network is in a stable state and that there are no other
mechanisms affecting the system. Furthermore, our fit-
ting is simply based on matching the linking probabilities
T of the data with the stable states of the model. More
elaborate fitting could be done (and has been done for
similar models [37]) using approximate Bayesian compu-
tation methods [38], which would allow one to include
more observables to be matched. It would also allow fit-
ting for more parameters, such as the time since the start
of the model t or ones needed for additional mechanisms.
In contrast to our approach, stationary, non-
mechanistic models, such as exponential random graphs
(ERGMs), can also be used to study the interplay be-
tween triadic closure and homophily [39–41]. The key
conceptual difference to our approach is that ERGMs
are static network models, which can be used to bal-
ance between the tendency towards triangles, homophilic
edges, homophilic trianges, and many other network fea-
tures as factors explaining the network structure, whereas
our approach is a model of cumulative interplay of two
explicit and microscopic network evolution mechanisms.
(Note, however, that some carefully crafted microscopic
network evolution models can converge, under certain as-
sumptions, to ERGMs as stable states [41, 42].) This
means that ERGMs do not explicitly model cumula-
tive processes or tell anything about multiple time scales
or meta-stable states, which we find as a consequence
of combining triadic closure with the choice homophily
bias. Furthermore, the hysteresis phenomenon, i.e. the
memory effects and multiple qualitatively different sta-
ble states for the same paramater values, we find emerg-
ing naturally as a consequence of triadic closure and ho-
mophily, would be considered as an undesirable feature
of an ERGM [43].
In the present approach it is assumed that the bio-
logical and cultural attributes underlying the homophily
are constant in time. While this assumption is almost
true for long-term individual characteristics such as gen-
der or religion, it is less so for traits like political affilia-
tion, occupation, and opinions. Networks where both the
edges and attributes change adaptively to each other, i.e.
following adaptive co-evolutionary dynamics, have been
studied extensively for biological, economic, and social
phenomena [44–46]. When the edges between nodes with
similar attributes are favoured, the adaptive dynamics
self-organise into heterogeneous networks where groups
of individuals sharing attributes are structurally distin-
guishable from each other [47–51]. Such a generic feature
of adaptive networks makes it likely that our observations
of the cumulative effects of triadic closure and homophily
will hold even in the case of time-dependent individual at-
tributes. Still, the study of an adaptive interplay between
triadic closure and homophily is a worthy line of future
research that may reveal additional, complex feedback
loops between social structure and attribute evolution.
The simplicity of our framework suggests that the pres-
ence of triadic closure and choice homophily for a given
attribute value is enough to explain some salient features
of empirical social networks like the homophily amplifi-
cation and core-periphery structures. Yet, the effects of
more realistic features of society such as the existence of
more than two values for a single attribute, structural
constraints beyond triadic closure, and the coexistence
of several attributes in a population [in the spirit of the
Axelrod model of cultural dissemination [52]],remain to
be studied. We anticipate that our results promote even
more interest in the data-driven computational simula-
tion of social interactions and shed further light on the
relationship between triadic closure and homophily. This
insight will help researchers and policy-makers in devis-
ing intervention strategies to decrease the most adverse
effects of homophilic decision-making, including segre-
gated social structures like gender-specific workplaces
and partisan political systems.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Model definition and parameters
We introduce a model of social network evolution and ho-
mophily dynamics with a simultaneous interplay of triadic
closure and choice homophily. The model is stylised such
that it contains a minimal amount of assumptions on how
social relationships are made and forgotten, but it is other-
wise maximally random. The initial social structure is a ran-
dom network with static attribute groups a and b (of relative
size na, nb with na + nb = 1) distributed among nodes uni-
formly at random and independently of the initial network
structure, such that there is a fraction Pab = Pba of edges
between groups, and fractions Paa, Pbb within each group
(Pab + Paa + Pbb = 1).
From its initial state the network develops by the nodes
updating their connections. At each time step we select a
focal node uniformly at random and a candidate neighbour,
representing a social encounter that might lead to a new so-
cial relationship (Fig. 1). The candidate neighbour is chosen
by triadic closure with probability c, or uniformly at random
otherwise [emulating any other mechanisms for edge creation
beyond triadic closure [25, 53–56]]. The triadic closure mecha-
nism can be algorithmically implemented in two ways [22]: by
connecting two neighbours of the focal node, or by connect-
ing the focal node with the neighbour of a neighbour. Since
both mechanisms lead to the same mean-field description of
the network evolution in the infinite size limit [57], we choose
the latter for our simulations.
After checking that a new edge between the focal node and
candidate neighbour would not create a multi-edge or self-
loop, the edge is created with probability Sab if the focal node
is in group a and the candidate neighbor is in group b. The
elements Sab form a 2× 2 bias matrix specifying the amount
6of choice homophily/heterophily in the social network. For
simplicity we parametrise the bias matrix as Saa = sa, Sab =
1− sa, Sbb = sb, and Sba = 1− sb, where sa (sb) is the choice
homophily for group a (b). In this way, when sa = sb = 1/2
all of the elements of the bias matrix are also 1/2, i.e. there is
no homophily bias. Note that multiplying the bias matrix by
a constant changes the speed of network evolution, but not
the fixed points of the dynamics.
Finally, as maintaining social connections requires mental
capacity and time investments, creating new connections im-
plies forgetting some of the old ones [58]. We model this
process by randomly removing an edge of the focal node after
a successful edge creation. Random link removal [55] does
not involve additional assumptions of social behaviour, and is
a typical choice in this type of social network models [along
with random node deletion [28, 53]].
Mean-field bifurcation analysis
We derive approximate analytical expressions for the tem-
poral evolution of the amount of observed homophily in a
social network based on a mean-field bifurcation analysis of
our model. In the case of two attribute groups, the state of
the system at time t can be tracked by a 2×2 matrix P , where
the element Pab is the probability that an edge chosen uni-
formly at random lies between groups a and b. Equivalently,
we may follow the dynamics of a 2 × 2 transition matrix T ,
where element Tab is the probability that following a random
edge from a node in group a leads to a node in group b. The
probability Mab that, in a single time step of the dynamics,
we create an edge between the nodes in groups a and b, re-
spectively, is given by
Mab = [c(T
2)ab + (1− c)nb]Sab. (1)
We then write a rate equation describing the change in the
fraction of edges within group a,
dPaa
dt
= naMaa − naTaa(Maa +Mab), (2)
and a similar equation for Pab. We determine the fixed points
of the dynamics and their stability through linear stability
analysis, and confirm the validity of the mean-field approxi-
mation via extensive simulations (see the SI for details of the
analytical solution of the model, and Fig. 2 for a summary of
the analytical results).
Numerical simulations
We use numerical simulations to verify the accuracy of the
mean-field approximation of Eq. (2) (Fig. 2B). We first con-
struct a random network with N = 105 nodes and the aver-
age degree 〈k〉 = 50. To create networks with different initial
conditions in terms of in- and out-group edges, we choose val-
ues for the fractions of the same-group neighbours Taa and
Tbb. For simulations in Fig. 2B the initial networks have
(Taa, Tbb) = (0.5, 0.5). For the inset we use two initial con-
ditions, i.e. (Taa, Tbb) = (0.1, 0.9) and (Taa, Tbb) = (0.9, 0.1).
We then create two random networks so that the number of
edges in each network corresponds to the desired numbers of
in-group edges. Finally we place the remaining edges ran-
domly between the two groups, so that the final network has
L = N〈k〉/2 edges.
Simulations follow the model definition described above.
Between times t and t + 1 we attempt to rewire L edges,
so that on average each edge in the network is chosen once.
For the parameters in Fig. 2B, t = 102 is enough for geting
convergence to a fixed point, while for the parameters in the
inset we need t = 103. Each point in Fig. 2B is averaged over
102 realizations, with the standard deviations smaller than
the marker size (see SI for a more detailed analysis of model
parameters).
Social network data
We use several large-scale social network datasets in order
to determine empirically the possible effects of triadic closure
on the observed homophily. The first one is Mobile, which
is a social network based on call detail records between mil-
lions of subscribers in a European country [60]. We draw
edges between the individuals if they have called each other
within a one-year observation period and divide them into
two groups based on the gender listed in subscription data.
The second one is Facebook,which is a friendship network of
two classes at the University of Pennsylvania in the US. The
dataset includes friendships and metadata for 100 universities
during 2005 [32]. For each university we use the subnetwork
of the two largest classes. The third one is Polblogs, which is
a network of political blogs collected in 2005 [34], with edges
between two nodes if at least one of the blogs links to the
other. The Blogs are split into two groups using the clas-
sification of liberal and conservative blogs provided by the
original study. The fourth one is School, which is a network
between students collected by automatically sensing the prox-
imity between individuals. The original data has a 20-second
time resolution for 2 days, which we aggregate into the edges
by considering two nodes connected if they have been in each
others’ proximity for at least 20 minutes during the obser-
vation period. Nodes are split into two groups according to
gender [33]. The fifth one is Last.fm, which is a snapshot of a
self-reported friendship network in a music listening website.
The network is split into two groups according to gender and
it includes only the users for which this information is avail-
able (see Table I for a summary of dataset features and SI for
more details).
Homophily measures and model fitting
In order to estimate the amount of choice homophily in
both groups of an empirical network, we need to solve the
following inverse problem: Given a certain value c of triadic
closure, we find the choice homophily parameters sa and sb in
our model, which lead to the observed edge fractions between
and within groups, Paa, Pbb and Pab. If we set c = 0 we get
a naive estimate of the biases that does not consider any tri-
adic closure, but, for example, corrects for a disproportionate
amount of links observed within large groups as compared to
small groups even if there is no intrinsic bias. Note, however,
that this feature of our estimation process leads to a differ-
ent size correction than the Coleman homophily index [59].
Increasing the value from c = 0, we see how an increasing
7group by N 〈k〉 na HIa HIb sa(0)/sb(0) sa(1)/sb(1)
Facebook class 14086 49.76 46.5% 0.451 0.512 0.734/0.748 0.649/0.633
Polblogs party 1224 27.31 48.0% 0.813 0.810 0.909/0.902 0.665/0.664
School gender 212 4.12 49.1% 0.308 0.213 0.656/0.605 0.595/0.602
Last.fm gender 188672 5.49 31.7% 0.168 0.106 0.621/0.540 0.588/0.550
Mobile gender 2173030 4.35 44.9% 0.100 0.057 0.555/0.526 0.540/0.535
TABLE I. Properties of empirical datasets. List of real-world social networks used in this study, their main properties
and estimated model parameters. N is the number of nodes in the network, 〈k〉 the average degree, na the fraction of nodes in
the smaller attribute group, HIa = (Taa − na)/(1− na) and HIb = (Tbb − nb)/(1− nb) the Coleman homophily indices [59] of
the groups, sa(0) and sb(0) the estimates of the bias parameters when c = 0, and sa(1) and sb(1) the estimates when c = 1.
amount of triadic closure changes the estimates of the choice
homophily biases (Fig. 3). We solve the inverse problem by
setting dPaa/dt = 0 in Eq. (2) and solving for sa and sb given
the matrix P , or equivalently the transition matrix T (See SI
for a closed-form formula).
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
1. Mean field master equation
Here we derive the mean-field master equation for the
social network model presented in the main text.
The mean-field master equation is derived in terms of
the (expected) transition probability matrix T giving the
probability that by starting from a node in group a and
following a uniformly random edge we end up in a node
in group b. For parts of the derivation it is helpful to
represent this same information using the edge density
matrix P , where the element Pab is the fraction of edges
between groups a and b. The transition matrix T (in the
mean field) can be written in terms of P as
Tab =
P ′ab∑
b P
′
ab
, (3)
where P ′ = P+Diag(P ), and Diag(P ) is a matrix where
non-diagonal entries of P has been set to zero.
Note that if there would be more than two groups then
there would be more independent elements in the transi-
tion matrix T than in the P -matrix. (When there are N
groups the T -matrix has N(N−1) independent elements
because by construction the rows always sum to one. For
the P -matrix there are N(N − 1)/2 pairs of mirror ele-
ments, e.g. Pab = Pba, and one equation that comes from
the fact that the probabilities sum to one. This leads to
N2−N(N −1)/2−1 = N(N + 1)/2−1 independent ele-
ments in the P -matrix.) This means that for more than
two groups the P -matrix is not uniquely defined by the
T -matrix. Also note that all diagonal P -matrices lead to
T -matrices that are just identity matrices, regardless of
the proportions between the different P -matrix elements.
9In our network evolution model the system is updated
such that the neighborhood of a random node is updated
in each step, and this update step is then repeated large
number of times. Thus, in order to write the master
equation we will first write down the equations describing
the change of the system in a single step. We define a
model matrix M , such that the element Mab gives the
probability that a link between groups a and b is created
in a single step of the model given that a node from group
a is selected. The model matrix can be written in terms
of T and the model parameters as
Mab = (c(T
2)ab + (1− c)nb)Sab, (4)
where nb is the fraction of nodes in group b.
In a single step of the model the expected number of
links between groups a and b increases if a link is formed
between them by selecting a node from either group a or
group b:
LP+ab =
{
naMab + nbMba, when a 6= b
naMaa, when a = b ,
(5)
where L is the number of links in the network. If a link is
formed between group a and any other group we remove
one link connected to the initial node and the expected
number of links between groups a and b decreases by
LP−ab =
{
naTab
∑
dMad + nbTba
∑
dMbd, when a 6= b
naTaa
∑
dMad, when a = b.
(6)
When we set the time unit so that in a single time unit
corresponds to L steps in the model, we can write the
rate equation as (see Eq. 2 in the main text)
dPab
dt
= P+ab − P−ab. (7)
In the case of two groups we are left with only two
independent elements of the P -matrix. In this case we
can write the P -matrix elements in terms of the T -matrix
Paa =
Taa(1− Tbb)
2− Taa − Tbb and Pbb =
Tbb(1− Taa)
2− Taa − Tbb , (8)
where we have used Tab = 1−Taa and Tba = 1−Tbb and
set (Taa, Tbb) 6= (1, 1).
We can now write the rate equation in terms of the
T -matrix elements by using the chain rule
dTaa
dt
=
∂Taa
∂Paa
dPaa
dt
+
∂Taa
∂Pbb
dPbb
dt
. (9)
For simplicity we choose the bias parameters such that
Saa = sa and Sab = 1− sa and similarly for group b. For
consistency we always choose to call the smaller group
group a and the bigger group group b. Since we only have
two classes the sizes of the groups are linked na+nb = 1.
a. Fixed points and stability
The rate equations (9) are non-linear equations which
in general do not have closed form solutions, but can still
be analysed with standard techniques in dynamical sys-
tems theory. We start by considering the fixed points of
the system. The fixed points can be solved by simulta-
neously solving the equations{
dTaa
dt = 0
dTbb
dt = 0,
(10)
where we must exclude (Taa, Tbb) = (1, 1), due to con-
straints on (9). This means that we are possibly exclud-
ing a line of fixed points that have Paa = 1 − Pbb. By
plugging this into the fixed point equation for P we get
{
dPaa
dt
∣∣
Paa=1−Pbb = (1− c)(1− na)na(1− sa) = 0
dPbb
dt
∣∣
Paa=1−Pbb = (1− c)na(1− na)(1− sb) = 0,
(11)
which has the solutions c = 1, na = 1, na = 0, and sa = 1
and sb = 1. This means that Paa = 1 − Pbb is a line of
fixed points only in the extreme cases when there is only
triadic closure, only one group or when both groups are
only willing to connect to the same group.
By setting values for the four parameters of the sys-
tem (na, c, sa and sb) we could solve the fixed points
numerically. However, when we leave one of the parame-
ters free we can solve the equations symbolically (which
we have done using symbolic computations with Mathe-
matica [1]). The solutions will be roots of single variable
polynomial equations.
We use linear stability analysis to find the local stabil-
ity of the fixed points. Let
A =
(
∂f
∂Taa
∂f
∂Tbb
∂g
∂Tbb
∂g
∂Tbb
)∣∣∣∣∣
(T∗aa,T
∗
bb)
(12)
be the Jacobian matrix of the system{
δTaa
δt = f(Taa, Tbb)
δTbb
δt = g(Taa, Tbb)
(13)
at a fixed point (T ∗aa, T
∗
bb) and where f and g are the func-
tions determined by Eq. 9. By calculating the trace and
determinant of the Jacobian matrix we can then deter-
mine the type (node, spiral, etc.) and stability (stable,
unstable, saddle) of the fixed points.
By solving the system for several sets of the parameters
(see Fig. 2E in the main text) we find that there are
always either one, three or five fixed points. If there is
only one fixed point, it is a stable node. If there are three
fixed points, two of them are stable nodes and the one
between them (in the (Taa, Tbb)-plane) is a saddle node.
When there are five fixed points, three of them are stable
nodes and the two in between the stable nodes are saddle
nodes. The only exceptions to this are the extreme cases
where Paa = 1− Pbb is a fixed point as discussed above.
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b. Edge cases
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FIG. 4. The red line shows the stable (solid line) and unstable
(dashed line) fixed points of the system when c = 1. The
dashed black line corresponds to the c = 0 system.
If triadic closure is the only mechanism, i.e. c = 1, and
the groups have the same homophily biases, sa = sb = s,
the rate equation (7) simplifies to
na(T
2)aa − naTaa
(
s(T 2)aa + (1− s)(T 2)ab
)
= 0
nb(T
2)bb − nbTbb
(
s(T 2)bb + (1− s)(T 2)ba
)
= 0
(14)
which can be solved in closed form. In terms of the P -
matrix we obtain
Paa =
{
1− Pbb
s−
√
s(2−3s)
4(−1+2s) , if 0 ≤ s < 2/3 ,
(15)
where in the latter case Pbb = Paa. We exclude the so-
lution Paa = Pbb =
s+
√
s(2−3s)
4(−1+2s) , because it would lead to
Paa + Pbb > 1.
Figure 4 shows the fixed points of the system in terms
of Taa. The solution Taa = Tbb = 1, corresponding
to Paa = 1 − Pbb, is an unstable center (Det(J) = 0,
Tr(J) > 0) when s < 2/3 and becomes stable at s = 2/3.
The transition point s = 2/3 is not smooth but it is con-
tinuous. Note that the behaviour of the system with only
triadic closure is independent of the group sizes.
In the other extreme case, when one group only accepts
links to the same group, i.e. sa = 1 and sb 6= 1 (or sb = 1
and sa 6= 1), numerical treatment (where sa = 1 (or
sb = 1) and sb(or sa), na, c ∈ {0.02, 0.04, . . . , 1}) shows
that the system does not have any fixed points unless
c = 1, na = 1 (or nb = 1) or sa = sb = 1.
c. Classification of the fixed points
The only type of bifurcation we see (as we vary any of
the four parameters) in the system is an imperfect pitch-
fork bifurcation, meaning that at the bifurcation point
one fixed point splits into three different branches. The
bifurcation is imperfect since the two new fixed points
0 + -
Stable
Unstable
FIG. 5. (Top) Schematic illustrations of the different classes
of fixed points and (bottom) bifurcation diagrams for a system
with model parameters na = 0.1, c = 0.95 and sa = sb = s.
Different colors correspond to different bifurcation branches.
Solid lines correspond to stable fixed points and dotted lines
to saddle points. Note that the three branches that are seen
in the Taa plot around s = 0.7 and s = 0.9 are almost over-
lapping in the Tbb-plot.
may be far from the original fixed point. Our classifica-
tion of the fixed points is based on these bifurcations.
Since the fixed points lie in the (Taa, Tbb)-plane, we
have three possible types of branches that emerge in the
bifurcation point, either the branch is in the upper left
half of the (Taa, Tbb)-plane (corresponding to the + con-
figuration, where the larger group forms the core), the
branch is in the lower left half (corresponding to the -
configuration, where the smaller group forms the core)
or the branch is closer to the Taa = Tbb -line (corre-
sponding to the 0 configurations, where both groups are
homophilous and their homophily can be amplified in
both groups).
When there are three or five fixed points we can clas-
sify the stable points by considering the positions of the
fixed points in the (Taa, Tbb)-plane. The branches with
the saddle points are harder to classify, as they may con-
nect two different stable branches and thus change config-
uration as we vary the parameters (see Fig 2.). However,
the ends of the saddle branches can be classified into the
configurations corresponding to the stable branches that
they connect to. When there is only one fixed point we
determine the configuration by considering which branch
the point belongs to in the bifurcation diagram.
Note that our classification is purely based on bifur-
cations and the different branches that emerge. Along
a single branch one group may change from being ho-
mophilous to heterophilous or vice versa, however, the
core-periphery structure remains in any given branch.
Other ways to classify the fixed points could involve com-
paring the homophilies of the groups using an index (be-
low we introduce a useful index based on our model), or
whether or not triadic closure amplifies the homophily of
the groups.
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d. Phase diagrams
Our dynamical system has 4 parameters and a full
summarization of this 4 dimensional space would be cum-
bersome. Instead, we focus on 2 dimensional slices chosen
from architypical places in the space (Fig 2E in the main
text). To find the 2 dimensional phase diagrams of the
system we first set two of the parameters to some values,
e.g. na = 0.1 and c = 0.9. We then solve the system in a
grid of the two other parameters, e.g. a 100x100 grid for
sa and sb. We look at the number of fixed points in each
of the grid points. If the number of fixed points changes
between two points we know that a boundary of a region
(bifurcation point) must exist between those points.
After we have found the rough boundaries in the grid
we use the bisection method to find the boundaries to a
desired accuracy (we set the tolerance to 10−4) first in
one direction of the grid and then in the other.
2. Simulations
a. Accuracy of the mean field approach
We use simulations to verify the predictions of the
mean field equations. To see how well the predicted
stable fixed points correspond to the fixed points in the
simulation we initially set the network to be in a sta-
ble fixed point in terms of the transition matrix T (but
otherwise maximally random). We then run the simula-
tion for 1000 steps and calculate the distance to the fixed
points predicted by the mean field. Simulations were run
for networks with N = 10 000 nodes and average degree
〈k〉 = 50.
The left panel in figure 6 shows a heat map of the
distance to the nearest fixed point predicted by the mean
field equation for several sets of parameters. The mean
field prediction is most accurate when sa ≈ sb and when
there is only one fixed point in the system. For some of
the parameter sets, however, the nearest fixed point after
the simulation was different from the initial state. The
right panel shows the distance between those points. In
these cases the system ends up far away from the initial
state. In some cases the final state of the systems is very
close to a fixed point which is not the initial one. This
suggests that the system goes to a fixed point predicted
by the mean field method, but just not the one that we
anticipated. This could be because local stability analysis
is sensitive to the random fluctuations of the simulations
which might carry the system state to a different fixed
point.
b. Time evolution and trajectories
To investigate the global dynamics of the triadic clo-
sure system we have simulated the time evolution of
the system. In these simulations the networks have
N = 10 000 nodes and average degree 〈k〉 = 20. We find
that the trajectories first go rapidly to an area between
the nullclines and then evolve slowly towards the fixed
points. This slowing down of the system is not surpris-
ing since near the nullclines T˙aa ≈ 0 and T˙bb ≈ 0, since
the right hand side of the Master equation is continuous.
Figure 7 shows some trajectories for two systems with
either equal or unequal group sizes, high triadic closure
probability and moderate homophily bias.
Figure 8 shows the time evolution of the trajectories
measured by the Euclidean distance to each of the fixed
points for two systems. In the early stages of the sim-
ulation the distance to all of the fixed points decreases
rapidly. After the fast initial stage the trajectories slowly
start going towards the stable fixed points. The separate
blue line in the left panel of figure 8 corresponds to a tra-
jectory that goes through the saddle point, this system
spends a long time near that point until random fluctu-
ations drive it to one of the stable points.
3. Data analysis
a. Details of the datasets
Here we give further details of the 6 network data sets
we use in the main text.
• Mobile phone network [2] is based on call data
records from 2009 and customer information
database of a single mobile service provider in a Eu-
ropean country. The network is constructed based
on this data in a way that each subscriber becomes
a node. Two individuals have a link between them
if both of them called the other at least once dur-
ing the period of 12 months. We split the network
into two groups according to the reported gender of
the individuals. We exclude those individuals that
have no gender information in the database.
• A network of political blogs [3] from February 2005,
where blogs are classified as either liberal or con-
servative. A link exists between two blogs if either
one has a link to the other on the front page.
• last.fm is a web service where users can share their
musical tastes and assign other users as friends. We
use the mutualized network of friendships and clas-
sify each user by gender. In the website the users
can include their gender in their profile information,
but when the self-reported gender is not available
it is inferred from the real first name reported by
the user.
• The facebook100 [4] dataset contains the Facebook
networks of 100 universities in 2005. We can es-
timate the homophily bias in each of the 100 uni-
versities in the facebook100 dataset. We took the
two largest classes for each university and took the
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FIG. 6. (Left) Distance to the nearest fixed point predicted by the mean field equation after 1000 simulation steps averaged
over 100 simulations. (Right) Distance between the initial state (a predicted fixed point) and the final state of the system for
those runs where the nearest fixed point after the simulation isn’t the same as the initial state. In both panels the parameters
correspond to those in Fig. 2E in the main text, i.e. in the upper row sa = sb = s and in the lower row sa 6= sb and c = 0.95, for
equal group sizes na = nb (left) and unequal group sizes na = 0.1 (right). Note that the maximum possible distance between
two points in the (Taa, Tbb)-plane is
√
2 ≈ 1.41.
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FIG. 7. Simulated trajectories for a system with equal group
sizes (left, na = 0.5, sa = sb = 0.6, c = 0.9) and unequal
group sizes (right, na = 0.1, sa = sb = 0.65, c = 0.97). Black
crosses show the analytical fixed points obtained from the
mean field equation.
subnetwork of containing those classes. See table II
for properties of these networks.
• The primary school [5] dataset contains the aggre-
gated contact network of primary school students
and their teachers during two consecutive days.
The contacts were recorded in 20s intervals. To bet-
ter reflect the more “meaningful” contacts we take
only those contacts that had a combined duration
of over 20 minutes during the two days. The stu-
dents are split into groups according to their gen-
der. As teachers did not have gender information
they are excluded from the network.
b. Estimation of intrinsic bias
To find out the possible model parameters for the em-
pirical networks we can solve the fixed point equations
for the bias parameters sa and sb. The fixed point equa-
tions are linear in sa and sb and thus they can be solved
in closed form such that,
sa =
nbTaa − cTaa[nb − (1− Taa)(Taa + Tbb)]
na(1− Taa) + nbTaa − c(−1 + 2Taa)[nb − (1− Taa)(Taa + Tbb)] and
sb =
naTbb − cTbb[na − (1− Tbb)(Taa + Tbb)]
nb(1− Tbb) + naTbb − c(−1 + 2Tbb)[na − (1− Tbb)(Taa + Tbb)] ,
(16)
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FIG. 8. Time evolution of two systems as measured by the
Euclidean distance to each of the fixed points for different
initial conditions. The system is initially in a state where
either Taa = 0.01 or Tbb = 0.01 (see Fig. 7). The system has
two very different time scales. First it evolves towards the
nullclines rapidly (∼ few Monte Carlo steps). After entering
the area between the nullclines the system starts to slowly
(∼ few hundred Monte Carlo steps) evolve towards the stable
fixed points. The model parameters are na = 0.5, sa = sb =
0.6 and c = 0.9 in the left panel and na = 0.1, sa = sb = 0.65
and c = 0.97 in the right panel.
where nb = 1− na.
We can measure the sizes of the groups na and nb as
well as the proportion of intra-group links Taa and Tbb di-
rectly from the data. We can then calculate the possible
values for sa and sb for a given triadic closure probability
c. Specially we can obtain a range of possible bias values
since c can only vary between 0 and 1.
When we set c = 0 we can use equations 16 to obtain
a naive estimate of the biases without triadic closure
sa(c = 0) =
nbTaa
na(1− Taa) + nbTaa
sb(c = 0) =
naTbb
nb(1− Tbb) + naTbb .
(17)
The correction for the groups sizes done by these esti-
mators are not equivalent to the Coleman’s homophily
index, because the sa and sb values written in terms of
the Coleman’s index depend also on the group sizes.
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TABLE II. Properties of the Facebook datasets. List of the Facebook social networks used in this study, their main
properties and estimated model parameters. N is the number of nodes in the network, 〈k〉 the average degree, na the fraction
of nodes in the smaller attribute group, HIa = (Taa − na)/(1 − na) and HIb = (Tbb − nb)/(1 − nb) the Coleman homophily
indices of the groups, sa(0) and sb(0) the estimates of the bias parameters when c = 0, and sa(1) and sb(1) the estimates when
c = 1.
class a, class b N 〈k〉 na HIa HIb sa(0)/sb(0) sa(1)/sb(1)
American75 2008, 2007 2313 60.07 48.9% 0.412 0.467 0.709/0.731 0.639/0.630
Amherst41 2008, 2009 756 56.13 49.7% 0.847 0.917 0.924/0.958 0.670/0.662
Auburn71 2009, 2008 6022 60.71 46.9% 0.640 0.541 0.827/0.763 0.649/0.656
BC17 2008, 2009 4250 65.98 49.0% 0.906 0.927 0.954/0.963 0.668/0.665
BU10 2008, 2009 7371 48.72 47.0% 0.872 0.908 0.939/0.952 0.669/0.663
Baylor93 2009, 2008 4726 69.07 49.9% 0.842 0.794 0.921/0.897 0.662/0.667
Berkeley13 2008, 2007 7546 63.79 49.6% 0.539 0.579 0.770/0.789 0.652/0.646
Bingham82 2007, 2008 3669 53.30 48.6% 0.432 0.415 0.719/0.704 0.633/0.631
Bowdoin47 2008, 2009 826 54.87 49.9% 0.873 0.931 0.937/0.965 0.669/0.663
Brandeis99 2008, 2007 1410 65.81 48.6% 0.657 0.688 0.832/0.841 0.661/0.655
Brown11 2008, 2006 2692 70.14 48.5% 0.774 0.803 0.889/0.899 0.666/0.661
Bucknell39 2008, 2009 1609 66.12 49.8% 0.818 0.866 0.909/0.933 0.668/0.662
Cal65 2008, 2007 3339 45.59 48.3% 0.499 0.646 0.754/0.819 0.662/0.640
Caltech36 2008, 2006 322 35.90 46.6% 0.413 0.602 0.715/0.793 0.661/0.629
Carnegie49 2009, 2008 2222 46.02 49.3% 0.824 0.766 0.913/0.882 0.661/0.667
Colgate88 2009, 2008 1278 61.92 49.9% 0.883 0.916 0.942/0.958 0.668/0.664
Columbia2 2006, 2008 3593 61.69 49.5% 0.762 0.804 0.882/0.901 0.666/0.661
Cornell5 2007, 2008 5794 77.55 49.5% 0.673 0.626 0.838/0.812 0.654/0.659
Dartmouth6 2008, 2007 2098 79.62 49.0% 0.708 0.713 0.856/0.855 0.661/0.659
Duke14 2008, 2009 3232 76.06 49.9% 0.828 0.891 0.914/0.946 0.669/0.662
Emory27 2009, 2008 2729 66.23 49.0% 0.855 0.816 0.929/0.907 0.663/0.667
FSU53 2008, 2009 8870 43.78 48.9% 0.711 0.769 0.858/0.883 0.666/0.658
GWU54 2008, 2009 4420 59.04 47.7% 0.885 0.913 0.945/0.955 0.668/0.664
Georgetown15 2008, 2007 2929 86.13 47.6% 0.686 0.708 0.848/0.849 0.663/0.656
Hamilton46 2008, 2009 868 57.65 49.2% 0.881 0.915 0.941/0.957 0.668/0.664
Harvard1 2007, 2008 3432 109.92 50.0% 0.735 0.732 0.868/0.866 0.661/0.662
Haverford76 2008, 2009 584 61.07 49.3% 0.695 0.791 0.849/0.894 0.668/0.656
Howard90 2008, 2007 1903 91.24 48.9% 0.616 0.631 0.811/0.813 0.657/0.653
Indiana69 2008, 2009 10028 63.40 49.3% 0.767 0.783 0.885/0.890 0.664/0.662
JMU79 2009, 2008 5856 55.36 46.0% 0.838 0.819 0.924/0.903 0.665/0.664
Johns Hopkins55 2008, 2009 1823 44.88 49.7% 0.812 0.897 0.907/0.948 0.671/0.660
Lehigh96 2009, 2008 1983 63.19 46.0% 0.894 0.880 0.951/0.936 0.666/0.666
MIT8 2008, 2007 1870 70.51 46.6% 0.490 0.542 0.754/0.763 0.652/0.638
MSU24 2008, 2009 10828 44.09 46.9% 0.670 0.770 0.842/0.880 0.670/0.653
MU78 2008, 2009 6012 60.82 48.1% 0.861 0.887 0.933/0.941 0.668/0.664
Maine59 2008, 2007 3511 37.95 46.4% 0.294 0.377 0.655/0.680 0.626/0.606
Maryland58 2008, 2007 7689 63.10 48.5% 0.508 0.568 0.757/0.780 0.653/0.642
Mich67 2008, 2007 1245 27.45 46.6% 0.349 0.414 0.683/0.699 0.634/0.617
Michigan23 2008, 2009 10390 51.31 48.4% 0.773 0.848 0.889/0.922 0.670/0.659
Middlebury45 2008, 2007 1104 74.69 48.4% 0.679 0.681 0.843/0.837 0.660/0.657
Mississippi66 2007, 2008 3397 85.63 49.8% 0.429 0.358 0.715/0.678 0.623/0.631
NYU9 2008, 2009 7890 53.43 48.9% 0.866 0.896 0.934/0.947 0.668/0.664
Northeastern19 2008, 2009 4671 44.18 49.3% 0.654 0.627 0.829/0.812 0.655/0.657
Northwestern25 2008, 2009 3556 61.98 48.8% 0.806 0.882 0.905/0.940 0.670/0.660
Notre Dame57 2008, 2007 4345 86.46 48.4% 0.640 0.645 0.824/0.819 0.658/0.655
Oberlin44 2008, 2007 1097 51.59 46.6% 0.442 0.509 0.730/0.746 0.648/0.631
Oklahoma97 2008, 2007 5685 75.16 47.5% 0.272 0.443 0.641/0.716 0.634/0.608
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class a, class b N 〈k〉 na HIa HIb sa(0)/sb(0) sa(1)/sb(1)
Penn94 2008, 2009 14251 42.49 47.2% 0.768 0.794 0.889/0.893 0.666/0.660
Pepperdine86 2008, 2006 1356 68.18 47.2% 0.505 0.594 0.760/0.790 0.657/0.640
Princeton12 2008, 2009 2112 56.49 49.5% 0.845 0.911 0.923/0.955 0.670/0.662
Reed98 2008, 2007 372 35.45 44.4% 0.380 0.435 0.704/0.704 0.641/0.619
Rice31 2008, 2007 1372 73.93 48.4% 0.435 0.454 0.722/0.723 0.639/0.632
Rochester38 2008, 2009 1761 47.96 48.7% 0.824 0.854 0.914/0.925 0.667/0.663
Rutgers89 2008, 2007 8875 51.61 49.2% 0.519 0.602 0.762/0.799 0.656/0.644
Santa74 2008, 2006 1512 67.45 44.8% 0.671 0.726 0.847/0.853 0.667/0.653
Simmons81 2008, 2007 636 37.27 44.7% 0.592 0.647 0.810/0.811 0.663/0.646
Smith60 2008, 2006 1158 41.70 46.0% 0.496 0.659 0.758/0.821 0.666/0.637
Stanford3 2008, 2006 3191 90.07 49.0% 0.724 0.744 0.864/0.870 0.663/0.660
Swarthmore42 2008, 2009 600 45.67 48.0% 0.754 0.893 0.881/0.944 0.674/0.656
Syracuse56 2009, 2008 5075 54.76 46.8% 0.822 0.786 0.916/0.888 0.663/0.665
Temple83 2008, 2007 4967 44.60 45.2% 0.523 0.631 0.774/0.805 0.663/0.640
Tennessee95 2008, 2009 5992 52.71 45.2% 0.589 0.696 0.807/0.838 0.668/0.646
Texas80 2008, 2006 10241 49.47 47.6% 0.571 0.674 0.791/0.832 0.664/0.646
Texas84 2008, 2007 12889 64.14 49.2% 0.389 0.441 0.696/0.719 0.635/0.627
Trinity100 2008, 2009 974 59.85 48.9% 0.886 0.927 0.944/0.962 0.669/0.664
Tufts18 2008, 2007 2257 77.10 49.1% 0.626 0.639 0.815/0.818 0.657/0.654
Tulane29 2008, 2007 2713 66.75 48.7% 0.523 0.567 0.765/0.780 0.652/0.644
UC33 2008, 2007 6172 55.91 48.6% 0.651 0.706 0.829/0.850 0.663/0.654
UC61 2008, 2007 4826 56.99 45.1% 0.591 0.690 0.808/0.835 0.667/0.646
UC64 2008, 2007 3156 40.75 42.2% 0.515 0.601 0.778/0.783 0.664/0.636
UCF52 2008, 2009 5869 34.42 49.5% 0.690 0.725 0.846/0.861 0.663/0.658
UCLA26 2007, 2006 6748 56.58 49.9% 0.321 0.460 0.661/0.730 0.635/0.619
UCSB37 2008, 2007 5477 60.42 46.9% 0.643 0.682 0.829/0.834 0.663/0.653
UCSC68 2008, 2007 3707 47.94 46.2% 0.579 0.656 0.799/0.820 0.663/0.646
UCSD34 2008, 2007 5584 57.40 45.0% 0.636 0.672 0.830/0.825 0.664/0.651
UChicago30 2008, 2009 2034 37.89 47.6% 0.809 0.874 0.908/0.934 0.670/0.660
UConn91 2008, 2009 6214 44.24 48.0% 0.779 0.789 0.893/0.891 0.665/0.662
UF21 2009, 2007 11337 44.39 47.5% 0.775 0.800 0.892/0.896 0.666/0.661
UGA50 2009, 2007 7817 53.81 49.5% 0.803 0.824 0.902/0.912 0.666/0.663
UIllinois20 2008, 2009 11602 56.39 48.4% 0.757 0.839 0.881/0.917 0.670/0.658
UMass92 2008, 2007 6475 51.51 46.3% 0.444 0.518 0.732/0.750 0.650/0.631
UNC28 2008, 2009 6656 55.80 49.8% 0.672 0.785 0.836/0.892 0.669/0.654
UPenn7 2008, 2009 4528 63.38 49.1% 0.871 0.923 0.937/0.961 0.669/0.663
USC35 2007, 2006 6041 71.29 48.0% 0.299 0.412 0.654/0.701 0.629/0.611
USF51 2008, 2007 4518 32.69 43.7% 0.266 0.442 0.646/0.706 0.639/0.602
USFCA72 2008, 2007 1094 47.92 46.8% 0.581 0.617 0.798/0.801 0.659/0.648
UVA16 2008, 2007 5889 83.05 49.2% 0.585 0.625 0.794/0.811 0.657/0.650
Vanderbilt48 2008, 2009 2923 75.78 49.1% 0.873 0.906 0.938/0.952 0.668/0.664
Vassar85 2008, 2009 1171 51.44 49.6% 0.809 0.868 0.905/0.934 0.669/0.661
Vermont70 2009, 2008 3173 39.93 48.6% 0.872 0.824 0.937/0.910 0.663/0.668
Villanova62 2008, 2009 2877 70.42 47.2% 0.885 0.917 0.945/0.956 0.669/0.664
Virginia63 2009, 2008 7883 41.58 49.8% 0.759 0.707 0.880/0.853 0.658/0.665
Wake73 2008, 2009 2068 68.63 48.3% 0.824 0.873 0.914/0.935 0.669/0.662
WashU32 2008, 2007 2721 90.04 48.0% 0.648 0.684 0.829/0.838 0.662/0.654
Wellesley22 2008, 2006 1041 49.22 47.0% 0.732 0.782 0.872/0.886 0.667/0.658
Wesleyan43 2008, 2009 1293 52.11 47.8% 0.833 0.900 0.919/0.948 0.670/0.661
William77 2008, 2009 2418 58.34 48.6% 0.830 0.875 0.917/0.936 0.668/0.662
Williams40 2008, 2009 941 52.86 48.0% 0.842 0.898 0.924/0.947 0.670/0.662
Wisconsin87 2008, 2007 8072 55.78 46.7% 0.460 0.539 0.739/0.762 0.652/0.634
Yale4 2008, 2007 2596 94.48 49.4% 0.650 0.698 0.827/0.848 0.662/0.655
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